I have a vested interest in Penn State. I attended University (main) from 1989-1994,
where I received my Bachelors of Science in Industrial Engineering (which I
still occasionally get to use today!). Some
of the best times of my life were spent at that University, and as anyone can
tell you, I’m an ardent PSU sports fan.
So, when the events of November 2011 took place and Gerald
Sandusky first was catapulted into the spotlight, I was as shocked as
anyone. And, when July rolled around and
the Freeh report was released, I was stunned at the sanctions levied. The media was united in its condemnation of
the University. The problem I had
stemmed from my training in engineering – I read the fucking manual. To wit, I, like many others (and many, many
not in the media) actually read the Freeh report and found its conclusions did
not match the evidence presented.
It became an easy exercise to figure out which of the
talking media heads had read the report or had not. Even at the release of the counter-reports –
the ones commissions by Paterno’s family – those same media heads could clearly
be exposed for being ignorant. Just
watching Mike & Mike on February 11, my wife and I were sitting there,
shaking our heads, incredulous that these public figures could talk so seriously
about the scandal without clearly haven’t done any reading for themselves. And that’s just how easy it is to separate the
knowledgeable people from those who are too lazy to know, don’t care (but want
to have their opinions heard), or just hate.
The more you read about the facts, the less you are inclined to
acknowledge the weakness of the amateur pundits out there.
I, for one, wasn’t going to have an uninformed opinion. So, I started with the James T. Clemente
report on the Freeh Report and Gerald Sandusky.
His credentials are substantially better than anyone you’ll see on
Sportscenter:
My analysis is based on my review
of the SIC report, grand jury testimony, preliminary hearing testimony, the
Sandusky trial transcripts, as well as articles, books, investigative reports, interviews,
documents, and my education, training, experience, and expertise in the field
of child sexual victimization. That expertise was developed over three decades
of work and study in the field; first as a prosecutor for the New York City Law
Department in the Bronx Family Court, then as a Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Special Agent on the Joint FBI/NYPD Sexual Exploitation of Children Task
Force, then on the MPD Cold Case and Major Crimes Task Force, followed by more
than a decade as a Supervisory Special Agent on the Behavioral Analysis Unit, Crimes
Against Children section in the FBI’s National Center for the Analysis for
Violent Crime (NCAVC), and as an expert witness in the field of child sexual
victimization.
I heartily encourage all of you to take the time to read
Clemente’s incredibly eye-opening and insightful report on what really happened
at Penn State. Do it to find the truth,
do it to be informed about your condemning opinion, but do it to do what the Freeh
Report failed to do: understate how sexual predators, victims, and witnesses
really behave.
I admit that I stated to read the report form a perspective
of gaining knowledge to right the wrongs of the Freeh Report, but I came away
from it moved and saddened. Not for the
University, but for the feeling of helplessness as Clemente describes the
operating behaviors of sexual “nice-guy” predators, and how it is the societal
rule rather than the exception to not recognize the signs. The children were the victims, but the whole
Penn State community was a victim of Sandusky’s predatory and sinister
behavior. Clemente paints a disturbing
picture that fits and explains all the pervading questions regarding the case,
and clearly demonstrates that if you think that people should have known or
conspired to protect Sandusky, you are perpetuating the myth of the
moustache-twirling bad guy and enabling the other Sanduskys out there to keep
doing what they are doing.
I have included several key passages that were particularly
impactful and informative to me – the report is full of revelations about the
case and predators that I was previously ignorant of. It is an amazing read, and even incredibly
compelling passages are somewhat diluted by being taken out of context.
I realize that summarizing a report for you instead of
having you read the whole thing is exactly how many of you out there got into trouble
in the first place – by relying on media pundits to summarize what “really
happened” at Penn State, instead of you taking the time to get an informed
opinion. However, I wanted to have a
record of key passages myself, for reference.
I’m just letting you in on my notes.
(Yes, I take scrupulous notes when I read something I want to
remember. I have a 160 page document of
just notes about a [1000-page] reference manual a recently read.)
As with the Freeh Report, Conclusions first!
Based on my decades of experience
with these exact type cases and offenders as skilled as Sandusky, it is
completely understandable, and in no way blameworthy or immoral, that Paterno
did not recognize Sandusky for what he truly was and do more. Years of
anecdotal evidence tells us that nearly anyone in his position, even those held
in the highest moral regard like Paterno, without an understanding of
acquaintance child sexual victimization, would have acted in the same way. What
Paterno did and didn’t do in this case is very different from what has been
revealed and litigated in the past in organizations like the Boy Scouts of
America, and the Catholic Church, where there was a knowing and deliberate plan
to conceal the explicitly documented sex crimes of multiple offenders to
preserve the name of the organization.
Given my 30 years of education,
training and experience working, evaluating and assessing child sex crimes
investigations around the world, it is my expert opinion that Paterno did not
know, or even believe in the possibility, that Sandusky was capable of sexually
assaulting boys. At worst, he believed that Sandusky was a touchy-feely guy who
had boundary issues. This fact is clear from his repeated statements before he
died. He did what he believed was reasonable and necessary to address the
situation based on his understanding of the facts, and his position at the
time. Paterno did what most people who cared about children would have done in
the same situation. More than a decade later, and in hindsight, Paterno showed
his concern for the victims when he stated he, “wished [he] had done more.” He
also said, “If this is true we were all fooled, along with scores of
professionals trained in such things, and we grieve for the victims and their families.
They are in our prayers.”
In the end, it was the perfect
storm of events that created the circumstances under which Paterno reasonably
failed to recognize the severity of what McQueary was trying to suggest to him
and consequently did not do more to address the issue. McQueary was overwhelmed
with confusion and disbelief at what he briefly witnessed in the shower in 2001
and did not effectively communicate what he saw to Paterno. McQueary knew
nothing about “nice-guy” acquaintance offenders, so he was completely
thrown-off by what he saw Sandusky doing to that boy. And he knew nothing of
“compliant victimization,” and therefore was further confused by the
counter-intuitive way in which the boy acted when they made eye contact during the
incident. Consequently, McQueary didn’t know what to do at first. He then went
to his father and Dr. Dranov for advice and was directed to inform Paterno.
Unfortunately, McQueary failed to use graphic sexual terms with Paterno, whom
he looked up to and respected. Instead, McQueary gave a watered-down version
with implied sexual behavior to Paterno who reasonably inferred
borderline/non-sexual behavior from McQueary’s words. Paterno, like everyone else who knew
Sandusky, simply fell victim to effective “grooming.” As an expert behavioral
analyst and based on my review of the evidence, Paterno did not believe that
the information he received from McQueary amounted to Sandusky being a predatory
child sex offender.
The fact that Sandusky molested a
number of boys over the course of several decades has nothing to do with Penn
State football or Joe Paterno. It could have happened under any head coach, of
any sport, in any school or university. If the public continues to convince
itself of that misperception, then they are unwittingly enabling other
“nice-guy” offenders who are out there right now. In doing so, they will cancel
out everything learned about acquaintance child sexual victimization during the
past several decades. They will not get us closer to understanding these cases
and preventing or limiting them in the future. And we, as a society, are doomed
to seeing this happen over and over again, at other schools and in other
settings. Unfortunately, this is the mistake that the SIC report made. There is
no other way to say it: on the most critical aspects of the Sandusky
investigation, the SIC report is a failure. It does a tremendous disservice to
Penn State, Joe Paterno, and the victims of Jerry Sandusky.
From the Introduction:
The SIC report makes a number of
errors and draws incorrect conclusions, but above all, the report ignores
everything we know about how acquaintance child molestation cases differ from
child abuse, and stranger and abduction-related child sex crimes. This case,
therefore, is not just about Penn State football, or State College,
Pennsylvania, or Joe Paterno; this case is about preferential, nice-guy,
acquaintance child sex offenders and how they groom, deceive, and defraud all
of us right under our noses. This case is about compliant victimization and the
shame, embarrassment, and guilt that drive victim behavior. It also is about
the exacerbating circumstances involved in male on male acquaintance child sex
crimes.
From Section I. The SIC Mandate and Conclusions:
This report will do two things.
First, it will explain in detail why each one of these [the Freeh Report’s] conclusions
is wrong due to a failure to consider the behavior, facts and circumstances
within the context of acquaintance child sexual victimization, a lack of
evidence, a failure to consider additional evidence, and/or direct
contradiction by the evidence contained in the SIC report itself. Second, it
will give the reader enough background to understand what really happened, and
how we can all work toward discovering other similar situations that are
occurring right now in communities across this country, and preventing still
others from happening in the future.
Before going any further it is critical
to note that Freeh based his report on “reasonable” conclusions. This is not a
standard of proof in any legal proceeding. It is tantamount to saying that it
“could” have happened that way. It is not anywhere near the standard of proof
in criminal cases, which is beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not sufficient
proof to meet the minimum standard necessary to win a civil lawsuit,
preponderance of the evidence. It is not even based on the weakest level of
proof necessary to qualify for a search or arrest warrant, probable cause, which
means that it is more likely to have occurred than not. Conclusions can be
“reasonable” and at the very same time they can be 100 percent wrong. This is
the case in many of the most important conclusions drawn in the SIC report. In
many instances, the conclusions that are drawn are not even “reasonable” in
light of the evidence.
From Section II. How the SIC Got It Wrong
Indeed, without understanding these
behavioral dynamics, we will repeatedly discover other offenders, like
Sandusky, who got away with it for decades, and no amount of compliance monitoring
and NCAA sanctions will make a difference. That’s what the SIC report does: it ignores
decades worth of research and analysis we have done trying to understand the
unique behavioral dynamics of these cases. The SIC treated this case as if it
were investigating a “stranger danger” or “monster predator” offender, instead
of the very different and insidious “nice-guy” acquaintance offender. Simply
put, in addition to the limitations of SIC’s mandate and the dearth of
available facts, the SIC got it wrong because they investigated the case in the
wrong way. It is a common mistake to think that all child sex offenders operate
in the same way and present as horrible, evil people, but that is absolutely
not true and it caused the SIC to draw erroneous conclusions.
From Section IIIB. “Nice-Guy” Acquaintance Offenders
The above passages underscore the
fact that even when it comes to trained law enforcement officers, it is very
difficult to determine whether a person, who everyone in the community knows
and respects, is a child sex offender. Sandusky is a textbook preferential
child sex offender, as well as being a textbook example of a “nice-guy”
offender. However, I would put him in the top one percent of effective groomers
in this country. This is based on the fact that he was so bold in his
high-profile “altruistic” public persona, he founded a youth serving organization,
and he was caught in the act — though cleared at the time — of what turned out
to be grooming and sexually assaulting children in the showers in 1998, yet he
still did the same thing in the same place again in 2001. Sandusky was able to deceive his way out of
it. He built his reputation both professionally and interpersonally over many
years of hard work and sacrifice. Drive, determination, selflessness, and
altruism were his calling cards. He motivated others to give millions to needy
children at The Second Mile. Sandusky was lauded and celebrated for his work.
He effectively groomed most of the people who came in contact with him,
including child care experts, psychologists, professionals, celebrities,
athletes, coaches, friends, and family. And most notably, he was approved
numerous times over thirty years as both a foster parent and an adoptive parent
by child care professionals.
From Section IIID. Compliant Victimization
One of the most counter-intuitive
aspects of child sexual victimization investigations is embodied in the concept
of compliant victimization. Children who are groomed into sexual victimization
typically do not call out to be rescued or disclose when questioned about
possible victimization because of a complex set of social and psychological
factors, including the fact that they don’t want anyone to know what has been
done to them or what acts they had to do with the offender. For some, this is
because they have finally found someone (the offender) who treats them well or
tells them they are special; someone who grants them entrée into a world they
never had a hope of entering before. Typically, this creates a feeling of
intense ambivalence on the part of the victims. On one hand, they love the
offender for the things he has done for them. On the other hand, they hate the
offender for the things he has done to them. That’s why the boy in the shower
in 2001 kept silent even though McQueary witnessed him being groomed and
assaulted by Sandusky. That’s why the nine other victims who testified, or were
testified about in Sandusky’s trial, never made an immediate outcry. Even when
investigators first came to some of these boys and asked them direct questions,
most of them remained silent or denied anything sexual occurred. They claimed
that they had not been victimized, when in fact they had. Eventually, most of
them made partial or incremental disclosures, and then over time gave a full account
of their victimization. It’s called the “conspiracy of silence” that surrounds
child sexual victimization. It is the opposite of an “active agreement to
conceal.”
From Section IIIF. How Offenders Use These Complicated
Dynamics to Their Advantage
The combination of nice-guy
acquaintance offending, coupled with the “conspiracy of silence” by victims and
“compliant victimization,” is why Paterno did not know that Sandusky was really
a child molester. It is why the entire State College community did not know.
One astute mother, however, saw a behavioral change in her son and recognized
it as a possible sign of victimization and reported Sandusky in 1998. She might
have initially bought into Sandusky’s grooming, giving him access to her child
hoping the relationship would help her son have a better life. But the
behavioral changes her son exhibited after spending an evening with Sandusky
triggered her intuition and she fought for her son’s protection. She is a hero.
Unfortunately, the system failed her, and her son. We all want to search for
the culprit who caused the system to fail. In my professional opinion, the
culprit is ignorance of “nice-guy” offending.
On the 1998 incident:
One psychologist, trained in the
art of deciphering offender behavior, Alycia Chambers, evaluated the boy, saw
and recognized all the red flags presented by Sandusky’s behavior, but her
report apparently did not receive the attention it deserved. Centre County
Children and Youth Services (CYS) referred the case to counselor John Seasock, who,
without reading Chamber’s report, evaluated the boy for one hour and then wrote
a report concluding nothing improper took place.
That is why no one at Penn State
did anything to sanction Sandusky. The University Police Department, the
Department of Public Welfare (DPW), and the District Attorney all closed their
cases based in large part on Seasock’s report. For those who worked closely
with Sandusky and knew about the 1998 incident, the closing of this
investigation as unfounded was confirmation of Sandusky’s outstanding
reputation and their belief that he was a devoted advocate for children.
Though a trained child sex crimes
investigator should have known to keep a close watch on Sandusky from that
point forward, civilians generally revert back to the thousands of positive interactions
they have had with him and validate the belief in their own minds that they
knew Sandusky couldn’t have been a “monster predator.” If he had been, they
tell themselves, they would have known. They would have been able to tell the
difference between that kind of evil person and the affable Sandusky they knew,
whom they viewed as a dedicated husband and father, who fostered and adopted
dozens of children, an altruist, who founded a children’s charity, and a
professional, who worked for decades as assistant football coach of one of the most
successful college teams in the country.
And the notion that Paterno could have or should have known
in 1998 or seen “red flags”:
Following the closing of this [1998]
investigation, UPD Detective Schreffler instructed Sandusky not to shower again
with any child. This explicit advice coming from the law enforcement
body responsible for policing Penn State — and not simply the head coach — should
have put Sandusky on notice that his actions were being scrutinized and
dissuaded him from showering with any more boys at Penn State or anywhere else.
UPD apparently did nothing else with respect to Sandusky beyond issuing this
“advice.” Curiously, while admonishing Paterno, Curley, Schultz, and Spanier
for not doing anything after the 1998 incident, for not limiting Sandusky’s
access to Penn State facilities, and for failing to protect children from
sexual victimization on campus, the SIC report makes no mention at all of the
UPD never following up on whether Sandusky was adhering to Detective
Schreffler’s admonition not to shower again with any child, never warning the
community, never warning The Second Mile, and never doing anything to monitor
or limit his access to children.
Certainly, the members of this
approximately 50-man police department were better trained in the area of sex
crimes and investigations than Paterno. Certainly UPD had the ultimate responsibility
to police and secure all facilities on Penn State’s campus. And certainly, UPD
had the ultimate responsibility to protect all persons, including children who
were guests on campus. Paterno is blamed by the SIC for not instituting his own
prevention program, when the very police agency that was charged with
conducting, and actually conducted, the 1998 investigation, did absolutely
nothing to investigate Sandusky further, to prevent him from bringing children into
the showers, or to inform university staff and students about the allegations
against Sandusky. That’s because Sandusky was cleared.
Paterno didn’t know about or have
access to the 98-page report that the UPD had compiled on the 1998 incident.
Paterno didn’t have a team of detectives who presumably were trained to
recognize sex offender behavior. Paterno’s profession had nothing at all to do
with children, or sex offenders, or investigations, or recognizing the red
flags of child sexual victimization. It is incorrect to assert that Paterno,
even as head coach and football icon, was in a better position to keep an
investigative eye on Sandusky and prevent him from offending on campus than was
the UPD.
Additionally, there is no mention
in the SIC report of why DPW or CYS didn’t warn The Second Mile about the 1998
allegations and investigation at the time. Nor did either of these public
agencies, whose mandates include the protection of children from sexual
victimization, make any effort to limit Sandusky’s access to children or to
re-evaluate Sandusky’s status as a foster or adoptive parent. There is no doubt
that the government agencies charged with investigating and protecting children
from child sexual victimization are in a better position to decide whether to
implement these types of protective measures than a football coach. Finally,
the SIC report did not mention why the District Attorney’s office, which
declined prosecution of Sandusky, did not direct its investigators to take any
of the steps that Paterno is accused of not taking to prevent Sandusky from
victimizing children. The SIC report cannot have it both ways: either the UPD,
DPW, CYS, and the DA’s office also should be accused of “callous and shocking”
“total disregard for the safety and welfare of Sandusky’s child victims,”or the
accusations against Paterno related to the 1998 incident are biased and wrong.
On McQueary’s actual testimony and conveyance to Paterno:
McQueary also testified to what he
did not see or hear. He did not see the front of Sandusky or the boy until the two
of them were standing three to five feet apart and were facing him. He did not
see any genitalia, erection, or insertion. He did not see any fondling. He did
not see any sex act. He did not hear any “protests or any verbiage.”
…However, when McQueary finally
testified, he admitted that he never actually saw anal penetration,
intercourse, or any other type of sexual act. And McQueary has consistently
testified that he did not tell Paterno any graphic details, so it is highly
probable that McQueary did not tell Paterno anything that would have led
Paterno to believe that Sandusky was sexually assaulting the boy in the shower.
…Though this was out of respect,
McQueary could not have done Paterno more of a disservice. In fact, the reason
McQueary didn’t want to use sexual terms with Paterno was the very reason why
he needed to. Paterno was known as a prude who was uncomfortable talking about
sex. Implying a sex act was not enough to undermine Paterno’s years of
interactions with Sandusky and Sandusky’s image as a pillar of the community.
McQueary needed to be direct, explicit, and comprehensive in his description.
If McQueary had simply said to Paterno, “I saw Sandusky having sex with a boy,”
then at least Paterno would have known what McQueary meant. Paterno may still
have had trouble believing McQueary, but he would at least have been aware of
what McQueary was saying. Instead, McQueary used general terms about the rough positioning
of Sandusky and the boy, using implications, which were easily
misinterpreted. McQueary, at various
times testified that when communicating to Paterno he used the phrases
“extremely sexual,” “sexual in nature”and “way over the line.” These are
examples of the kind of specific language that should not be taken as exact
when recounted a decade later.
Nonetheless, even if McQueary did
use phrases like, “extremely sexual,” “sexual in nature,” and “way over the
line,” or some other variation on this theme, the inclusion of these phrases,
while at first may appear to raise the severity of the allegation, actually
detract from the probability that McQueary had effectively communicated what he
believed he saw. That is, Sandusky having sex with a boy. These phrases would
be unnecessary if McQueary had said or even effectively insinuated that
Sandusky was having sex with the boy. If you tell someone you witnessed sex, you
do not need to add that sex is “extremely sexual” or “sexual in nature.” If you
tell someone you witnessed a 57-year-old man having sex with a 12-year-old boy,
there is no reason to add that it was “way over the line.”
On McQueary’s reaction:
Possibly hearing the noise of the
locker, when McQueary looked back into the shower, Sandusky and the boy had
separated and both were looking directly at McQueary. McQueary claims that he
never saw any genitalia or erections. Even if you believe his later account that
he slammed his locker shut, and that is what separated Sandusky and the boy,
McQueary did nothing more. He ran away. This
is a remarkable admission by McQueary; and, it is one of the facts that gives
us the most insight into McQueary’s behavior and his subsequent actions and
inactions. Consider for a moment what we know about McQueary.
In 1997, less than four years
prior, Mike McQueary started as quarterback in all 12 games for Penn State. He
was a team captain. In Penn State’s six home games, McQueary played in front of
an average crowd of 96,000 while hundreds of thousands more watched the games
on national television. As a quarterback, McQueary was responsible for not only
knowing his own assignments and his different options, but the assignments and
options of his ten other teammates. Furthermore, during every play, McQueary
had to read and anticipate the movements of all eleven defenders, many of whom
were McQueary’s size or larger and some were faster and stronger. Most of the
time these defenders were trying to confuse McQueary and force him into mistakes
or crush him. In the two to four seconds between the snap of the ball and the
need for decisive action, McQueary had to assess the positions of all other
players and avoid the rush of the defenders determined to take McQueary to the
turf. McQueary repeated this exercise thousands of times in practice and games
throughout his high school and college career.
So, what would cause a 26-year-old
man, who was 6’4”, over two hundred pounds, and had excelled in one of the most
pressurized, scrutinized, action-oriented positions on the field to not act?
Some believe that he wanted to save the name of Penn State football and so he
decided to forget what he saw and walk away rather than to act to save the boy
or restrain Sandusky. However, if this were true, he would not have attempted
to tell five other people about what he saw and he would not have been so upset
while he was trying to do so.
In my experience the reasonable
conclusion is that he was so overwhelmed by what he saw that he was paralyzed
with confusion and disbelief. He did not understand how a man he knew and
respected could possibly be doing something like that to a boy. He could not understand
why the boy was not screaming out in pain or protest, or fighting to free
himself. He could not understand why, when faced with a potential rescuer
(McQueary), the boy did not even ask for help. He could not understand how
Sandusky could just stare at him with a blank expression only seconds after he
was apparently sexually assaulting a boy. And he did not understand how any of
this could have happened in his own football locker room. Quite simply, in
McQueary’s mind, it did not compute.
On the reaction of the “conspirators” to McQueary’s
information:
What we do know from Paterno’s
recounting of events and his later shock and surprise when he finally read
McQueary’s statements in the presentment the week of November 7, 2011, was that
Paterno did not have any idea that McQueary was trying to tell him that Sandusky
was sodomizing the boy or even sexually assaulting the boy. When asked by an investigator
if McQueary said there was a sexual act, Paterno responded, “He never said
that.”When Paterno finally read the presentment, he asked his son what the word
“sodomy” meant. After his son explained
it to him, Paterno asked, “Can a man even do that to a boy?” Nonetheless, as Paterno explained, if he had
been told that Sandusky was raping a boy, or having sex with a boy in the
shower, he “would have gone to the police right then and there, no questions
asked.”
Is it reasonable to believe that
five responsible adult men to whom McQueary reported the 2001 Sandusky shower
incident, understood what McQueary was implying, and still did not feel the
need to call the police? Is it reasonable to believe that they all turned a
blind eye to the sexual victimization of a child? In my opinion, based on
investigating, consulting on, and studying thousands of similar cases, it is
more reasonable to conclude that these five men did not understand the true
nature of Sandusky’s actions because McQueary did not convey what he thought he
had conveyed to them. That’s because McQueary relied on implication, and deliberately
did not use explicit or graphic terms in describing what he thought he
witnessed in the shower.
The fact that none of the people to
whom McQueary reported his observations took any steps to notify the police, is
a strong behavioral indicator that none of them believed at the time that such
action was called for based on what McQueary had told them. All of them also
knew that McQueary himself did not call the police. McQueary did not convey to
John McQueary, Dr. Dranov, Paterno, Curley, or Schultz what he thought he had
conveyed. Hence, the people to whom he reported the incident responded to what
they gleaned from his disclosure, not to what was hidden in his mind. The fact
that the accounts of all of these men are fairly consistent with each other on
the non-sexual nature of what McQueary actually reported to them, is strong corroboration
for the accuracy of their accounts and that assessment.
On the mistaken belief that someone had to know:
Most people in the general public
believe that close colleagues, nice guys, altruistic people, dedicated
professionals, good fathers, child advocates, people who love children, cannot at
the same time be child sex offenders. But this belief is not true at all. A
large percentage of child sex crimes victims are victimized by teachers,
priests, boy scout leaders, mechanics, trainers, psychologists, doctors,
reporters, actors, anchormen, camp counselors, coaches, police officers, and
even FBI agents who are well thought of in the community. They are “good
people” who work hard, pay their taxes, raise families, go to church, act
normal, but they all hide very dark secrets.
There also is a common
misperception in the public that someone had to have known what Sandusky was up
to all of those years: The coaches and others at Penn State must have known and
covered for him. After all, molesters are different from the rest of us.
Because they have such evil thoughts on the inside, they must be weird, quirky,
or “off” on the outside. We assume that people close to the offender probably
knew something was wrong and suspected something but chose to ignore it. People
must have seen the red flags but kept quiet because he was Jerry Sandusky. This
could not be further from the truth.
On the belief that people can immediately and quickly
identify red flags of “nice guy” perpetrators:
The false belief that those who
knew Sandusky understood and covered up his offending is rebutted by more than
just the experiences and testimony of his friends and former colleagues. Consider
the testimony of Joe Miller. At the time of Sandusky’s trial, Miller worked for
the Chambers Environmental Group in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, and on the side
he coached wrestling at an elementary school. But he was well aware of
Sandusky’s reputation in the community. Miller testified for the prosecution at
Sandusky’s trial to corroborate the testimony of Victim 1. According to Miller,
in 2006 or 2007, Miller was driving home from school after practice. His son
had left his wrestling gear at school, so Miller went back to get it. When
Miller returned, he noticed that a light was on in the weight room. Here is
Miller’s description of what happened next:
[S]o I went in there to turn the
light off. And the light switch was to my right, and I heard something when I went
to turn the light off. And before I turned the light off, I turned to my left
and I saw Jerry and [Victim 1] all the way in the back far corner beneath the rock-climbing
wall on a small, little exercise mat, and they were laying there fact-to-face,
side-to-side — or face-to-face on their sides. And by the time I turned and
looked, Jerry propped himself up on one arm and looked at me and said, “Hey,
Coach, [Victim 1] and I are just working on some wrestling moves.”
And I didn’t think really a whole
lot of it because I’ve seen Jerry with him a number of times and I looked at
Jerry as, you know, sort of a father figure to [Victim 1]. So I said, “Okay,
Jerry, no problem. Just make sure you turn the light off and secure the door before
you leave.”
On the ride home, Miller started to
think about it. He thought it was kind of “peculiar” that Sandusky would be
working on wrestling moves late in the evening on a small mat in the back
corner of the weight room when there was a whole wrestling room right next
door. The wrestling move Sandusky was supposedly showing Victim 1 was unlike
any wrestling move Miller was familiar with. Moreover, to Miller’s knowledge,
Sandusky did not know anything about wrestling. As these thoughts passed
through his mind, he reached this conclusion:
“Well, it’s Jerry, Jerry Sandusky.
He’s a saint, you know. What he’s doing with these kids, it’s fantastic, you
know.” I didn’t think anything of it.
Joe Miller has a son the same age as
Victim 1 and who was in the same grade at the same school. He also has a son
two years younger than Victim 1. Miller is a responsible, concerned father who
cares about his own sons, as well as the other young boys he coaches in
wrestling. Miller witnessed Sandusky in the process of grooming, and the
beginning of a sexual assault as Victim 1 later testified. Yet, Miller, like
everyone else, looked right past it. He missed it not because of the culture of
football, or fear of bad press, or indifference to the safety of children, but
because of ignorance regarding “nice-guy” acquaintance offenders.
On what Paterno did what he did and no more:
As an expert in the field of child
sexual victimization, I firmly believe that there is another far more
reasonable explanation for Joe Paterno’s behavior than the one proffered by the
SIC report: (1) McQueary did not convey to Paterno that he thought Sandusky was
having sex with the boy, and (2) Paterno could not make the huge leap from the
watered-down, sketchy description and superficial information McQueary told him
to the realization that Sandusky was actually a child sex offender.
Paterno simply could not reconcile
what he knew of Jerry Sandusky with the thought that Sandusky was a huge fraud
and a child sex offender. The man Paterno thought he knew through thousands of
interactions over decades working with him as a brilliant defensive coach, a
loving husband and father, a devoutly religious man, a mentor to disadvantaged
kids, an altruist, a teetotaler who looked down on those who drank alcohol, a
selfless advocate for disenfranchised youth, a long time colleague, a
compassionate advocate for players, and a “goofy” prankster, could not possibly
be a “monster predator.” This man could not possibly have pulled the wool over
Paterno’s eyes for decades. He could not have fooled so many coaches, athletes,
administrators, contributors, social services workers, psychologists, children,
friends, and family. After all, if Sandusky had actually been victimizing
children, where were all the victims that he took advantage of? Why hadn’t any
of them come forward? In fact, in all the years that Sandusky was molesting
boys, not one of them came forward to make an allegation of sexual assault
against Sandusky until Victim 1 did at the prodding of his mother and counselor
in 2008. To Paterno, what McQueary was ineptly suggesting must have all seemed
like a huge misunderstanding. Nonetheless, McQueary seemed very upset about what
he’d seen. So, in spite of all his reasonable doubts, Paterno reported what he
learned up the chain of command in hopes that those more qualified than him
would know how to handle the situation and “get to the bottom of it.”
Paterno then stepped out of the
decision-making process and may or may not have been kept abreast of how the
administration handled the situation. However, according to McQueary, in the
few months after McQueary’s report, Paterno checked up on McQueary a couple of
times asking him if he was “okay.” In other words, Paterno presented McQueary
at least two opportunities over the next few months — after time had passed and
McQueary’s emotions had subsided — to tell Paterno the explicit details of what
he had seen or express displeasure with how the matter was being handled.
Despite these opportunities, McQueary remained silent.
On Paterno Not Part Of Any “Active Agreement To Conceal”:
In this case, there are no emails
or other electronic communications written by Joe Paterno to any conspirators.
There are no emails or other electronic communications written by any
conspirators to Joe Paterno. There are no documents that purport to lay out any
instructions by Paterno in furtherance of any conspiracy. There are no audio or
video recordings of Paterno engaging in any conversations about, or acts in
furtherance of, any conspiracy. There are no witnesses who report that Paterno
was actively involved in a conspiracy. And, there are no coconspirators who
claim that they conspired together with Paterno. In short, there is absolutely
no evidence at all that Paterno actively participated in an agreement to
conceal… Without such evidence, it is simply wrong to accuse a person of such a
criminal act.
All available evidence also
suggests that Paterno did not (1) dissuade McQueary from believing what he saw
Sandusky doing in the locker room, (2) persuade McQueary to forget what he saw,
(3) ask McQueary who else he had told, (4) tell McQueary to keep what he saw a secret,
(5) filter, shape, or edit what McQueary told the Penn State administration
about what he saw, (6) attend the administration’s interview of McQueary, (7)
debrief McQueary about what he had recounted to the administration, (8)
participate in the administration’s investigation of the events that McQueary
reported, (9) dissuade the administration from thoroughly investigating what
McQueary reported, (10) make any attempt to hide what the administration found
during their investigation of what McQueary reported, (11) make any attempt to
prevent the administration from acting as it deemed appropriate as a result of
their investigation into what McQueary reported, or (12) limit or shape what
the administration reported to The Second Mile.
In the United States we enjoy the
presumption of innocence. If an investigation finds no evidence to prove a
crime, you must not make leaps of faith and jump to conclusions to find participation
in that “crime.” For all the above stated reasons, it is erroneous to attempt
to tie Paterno, using innuendo and conjecture, into any agreement to conceal as
the SIC claims.
On the actions of Curley, Spanier, Schultz:
Curley then goes on to lay out in great detail a scripted version of what he planned to say to Sandusky when he met with him. Included in that version is a detailed discussion of under which circumstances he will notify The Second Mile and maybe notify DPW [Department of Public Welfare] and under which circumstances he will notify both. Therefore, the notifications of DPW plans devised on 2/12/01 were the same as those recounted in the 2/27/01 email. Hence, there was no change in plans instigated by Paterno. He was not an intervening cause in any change of plans because the evidence shows there was no change of plans with regard to conditionally notifying the DPW. Therefore, there was no conspiracy or any agreement to conceal.
At the time, everyone still believed that Sandusky was a respected member of the community. This is why Schultz called this plan “more humane and upfront.” It wasn’t because he was indifferent to child victims; it was because he had no idea that there were any child victims. It was humane because it contemplated not going behind Sandusky’s back with embarrassing information, and it was upfront because it contemplated telling Sandusky the whole truth. Apparently, their earlier discussions, which were only briefly summarized by Schultz in the 2/25 note and the 2/26 email, must have contemplated only talking to Sandusky about the appropriate use of the facilities.
…They never even contemplated that
Sandusky might have been committing sex crimes against boys, which is why they
never even discussed the issue or discussed going to the police.
Either way, informing The Second
Mile is clearly not keeping the information in-house or concealing information.
The Second Mile was an independent child care agency/charity founded by
Sandusky but run by a board and a CEO. It is also the most likely place where Sandusky
obtained access to the child in question. Accordingly, The Second Mile is
precisely the organization that was in the best position to identify that
child. And, because its CEO, Jack Raykovitz, was a licensed psychologist, he
was a mandated reporter of any sexual victimization allegations regarding any
children within his professional or institutional care.
…It is clear from the notes and
emails beginning on 2/12/01 through 2/28/01 that Curley, Schultz, and Spanier
are trying to develop and execute a plan to make their former colleague understand
and accept that he has a problem, which they naively believed professional help
would resolve. There is no indication in any of these documents or in their
behavior that these men had any idea of the actual nature and extent of
Sandusky’s “problem” or that he had long ago progressed to being a child sex
offender.
Other errors and erroneous conclusions of the Freeh Report:
The
SIC concludes that there was “[a] culture of reverence for the football program
that is ingrained at all levels of the campus community. It is only because the SIC report lacks an
understanding of the dynamics of acquaintance child sexual victimization that
it has misconstrued the behavior of the individuals involved and blamed
Sandusky’s ability to hide and continue his offending on the “culture of
reverence for the football program.” If the writers of the SIC report had fully
understood those dynamics, they would not have been searching for reasons why
Paterno and others did not recognize Sandusky’s offending behavior for what it
was.
According
to the SIC, “At the very least, Mr. Paterno could have alerted the entire football
staff in order to prevent Sandusky from bringing another child into the Lasch Building.”
This is a baseless suggestion. Paterno would have made himself vulnerable
to a defamation lawsuit or other action if he had spread rumors about Sandusky
after he was cleared of wrongdoing in this matter. Those at Penn State who knew
about the 1998 investigation would have had no reason to suspect that this was
not an isolated incident that would never be repeated because Sandusky had been
admonished not to shower again with any child by the UPD.
According
to the SIC, Paterno’s “failure to protect the February 9, 2001 child victim or
make attempts to identify him, created a dangerous situation for other unknown,
unsuspecting young boys who were lured to the Penn State campus and football
games by Sandusky and victimized repeatedly by him.” Paterno had no way of knowing that
Sandusky had any victims. Sandusky had been cleared in 1998 and he did not know
McQueary was trying to tell him that he thought Sandusky was actually having
sex with the boy in the shower in 2001. Additionally,
with respect to making attempts at identifying the victim in 2001, the plans that
Curley may have talked over with Paterno included notifying the chair of The
Second Mile. Paterno had known and worked with Sandusky for over 30 years by
this time and he was well aware that Sandusky often brought The Second Mile
children to Penn State and elsewhere. Had Paterno been told any details of
Curley’s plans, Paterno would have had every reason to believe that by
informing The Second Mile of what Sandusky was seen doing with a boy in the
shower, The Second Mile would easily be able to identify that child and
investigate what if anything happened to him that day. To say that he did
nothing to identify that child or protect him or other boys from victimization
is simply inaccurate.
